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The Dangerous New US Consensus on China and the Future of
US-China Relations
Mel Gurtov and Mark Selden
The trade war and technological competition
with China are symptomatic of a much larger
issue: a dangerous gridlock in US-China
relations that may become permanent, with
dire consequences not just for the two
countries’ economies but also for the global
economy and quite possibly East Asia’s and
international security. Martin Wolf, Financial
Times columnist, is right to conclude: “Acrossthe-board rivalry with China is becoming an
organising principle of US economic, foreign
and security policies.” 1 The fact that this
conflict has occurred at a time of trade,
investment, and security disputes between the
US and its major allies, US-Russia tensions, and
US military interventions across the Middle
East and Central Asia, heightens global
instability.
In the 1980s, President Ronald Reagan charged
that Japan “is stealing our future” “by
counterfeiting or copying of American
products.”2 Now the president’s target is China,
with the anti-China chorus including not only
leaders of Trump’s national security team but
also his former senior adviser and arch cold
warrior, Stephen Bannon, and a range of
national security, economic and Asia specialists
across the political spectrum.3 In 2011 Trump
the businessman was decrying China’s unfair
trade and technology practices, calling China
an enemy, and saying that if he were president,
he would be able to force China to back down
because it needs us more than we need
it.4 Today China looms so much larger—central
to US and global trade and investment, but also
a partner in critical relationships with many
other countries, including major US allies such

as South Korea, Japan, Australia, and the
5
European Union.
We argue that to make China the number-one
threat to US national security, as Trump would
have it, 6 is not merely an exaggeration and
misunderstanding of China’s ambitions and
capabilities. It is a dangerous basis for US
foreign policy, one that is inseparable from the
Trump administration’s broader agenda that
includes embrace of useful dictators, disregard
for human rights and international law,
diplomacy reliant on threats and sanctions, and
overturning or weakening of international
treaty commitments.

The Rising Tide of Anti-China Sentiment
Washington politicians in both parties are as
one in talking up the China threat and how to
counter it. A bipartisan consensus in Congress
seems to have concluded that the era of
engaging China is over. More surprising is an
emerging consensus among public
intellectuals, including China specialists as well
as many in both the conservative and liberal
media, who embrace the view of Trump’s
intelligence community that China is the
principal threat to US national security.7 The
New York Times, for instance, editorialized on
July 21 that “President Trump is correct to try
to establish a sounder relationship with Russia
and peel it away from China.” And while the
Washington Post has called for a return to
engaging China, it nevertheless found that “Mr.

1
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

17 | 15 | 5

APJ | JF

Xi’s regime has shattered the hopeful vision”
that China would be “a responsible global
player.”8 In fact, a hard line on China seems to
be the single policy on which liberals and
conservatives are in general agreement with
one another and with President
Trump.9 American public opinion has followed,
with a significant shift toward seeing rivalry as
the appropriate motif of US-China relations.10

Xi Jinping (left) and Donald Trump

The voices so stridently attacking China
typically ignore the fact that the US under
Trump has torpedoed international
agreements, from the Trans-Pacific Partnership
(TPP) to the Paris climate accord and the
Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty,
defied international law by withdrawing from
the Iran nuclear agreement and carrying out
economic warfare against Tehran, and ordered
that his trade representative seek to remove
China’s status as a developing country in the
World Trade Organization.11 These actions have
undermined US leadership and cemented the
Chinese conviction that it is now Beijing’s time
to define regional and global responsibilities.
Supplementing its position as the world’s
second largest economy and leader in
international trade, China has now moved with
the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to lead the
world’s largest aid program, one that has
secured the active participation of leading
nations, including US allies. Beijing now has its
eyes trained not just on trade and climate
change but also on economic development

strategy, sustainable energy, and international
aid.
Xi Jinping’s China has certainly done things
that merit strong criticism, notably the
incarceration and “reeducation” of roughly a
million Uighurs and other Chinese Muslims, the
communist party’s assault on independent
lawyers, journalists, and labor rights activists,
and militarizing of disputed islands in the South
China Sea. Still, there are compelling reasons
for seeking common ground with China—on
trade, energy, missiles, and the climate crisis,
for example—identifying financial and
technological complementarities, and averting
a breakdown in US-China relations that would
undermine the international economy and
could lead to war
This growing convergence of opinion between
the liberal establishment and Trump and the
Republican Party over the threat of China does
not mean that there is an identity of views
about how best to confront that
threat. 12 Whereas the Trump administration
and Republicans in Congress view China in
ideological, military, and trade terms, liberals
seem more concerned with the technological
and human rights elements. 13 But the two
camps coalesce around the urgency of halting
what they see as China’s predatory
commercial, industrial and technological
strategy and its alleged spying at US
universities and laboratories. Perhaps most
importantly, they commonly see China in
national security terms—threatening US
hegemony. In short, they share a commitment
to ensuring that the US remains the numberone power in the world.
China specialists could once be counted among
China's best friends, not as fellow travelers but
as people knowledgeable enough about the
country and its history to understand the
difference between expansionism and defensive
behavior and the importance of seeing the
world through Chinese eyes. Many offered a
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balanced view of China's domestic reforms
while recognizing a range of complementary
interests linking the US and China and China’s
critical role in stabilizing the hegemony of the
US dollar through its purchase of $1.1 trillion
in US treasuries, fully 27 percent of the US
debt held by foreign countries. 1 4 China
specialists consistently warned against
confusing China's intentions with its
capabilities. They also pointed to the need to
maintain active engagement at every level with
Chinese counterparts, drew a line between the
repressive state and an increasingly mobile and
market-oriented society, and above all
emphasized the value of a realistic approach to
US-China relations that served the interests of
both countries.
Today, however, many former sympathizers
seem disappointed in China’s failure to
embrace liberal values and open its political
system to democratic reforms. The 30 t h
anniversary of the 1989 suppression of the
democracy movement provided an enormous
boost to critics, with an outpouring of
commentaries and photographs from former
student leaders and demonstrators in the
United States, Europe and beyond. Nicholas
Kristof, who was at Tiananmen on 6/4, writes
that “those of us who witnessed Beijing Spring
are confident that eventually, unpredictably,
15
the tide of freedom will roll in again.” Such
disappointment stems in good part from a
misreading of the nature of the PRC’s reforms
since 1978. What the Chinese Communist Party
calls “political reform” involves personnel and
procedural changes designed to facilitate
economic growth—anti-corruption drives,
emphasis on professionalism and technical
expertise, greater separation of party and state,
and above all political stability—without
sacrificing (indeed, under Xi Jinping, moving to
strengthen) the party’s supremacy in all walks
of life.
Some liberals jumped on the anti-China
bandwagon after Vice President Mike Pence

delivered an in-depth indictment of that
16
country on October 4, 2018. Pence described
China’s interference in US politics as a “wholeof-government” threat, a point endorsed by
(among others) Winston Lord, the former US
ambassador to China. But Pence’s speech was
full of historical inaccuracies about the USChina relationship, unwarranted braggadocio
about America’s critical role in China’s rise,
and dangerous rhetoric about Chinese
“aggressiveness.” Above all, Pence seriously
misinterpreted China’s international strategy
and objectives, making it seem as if Xi Jinping
is committed to promoting revolution abroad
and
undermining
democracy
worldwide. 1 7 Actually, the latest Chinese
national strategy report indicates that domestic
threats, namely “separatism,” are the
leadership’s primary security concern. The
report also acknowledges weaknesses in the
People’s Liberation Army that make it a
regional rather than a global military force like
that of the United States.18

Trade War: A Sign of Things to Come
The trade war, as the public face of US-China
conflict, is particularly worrisome because it
reflects a perception problem that might make
a bad situation worse. What Trump is doing in
imposing blanket tariffs on virtually all Chinese
imports is entirely in keeping with his
aggressive business style: threaten one’s
adversary, avoid making concessions, don’t
back down, and above all win. The trouble with
that approach is that China has a long history
of dealing with threats from powerful
adversaries. By typically denouncing them as
“bullying” and “humiliation,” Chinese leaders,
most notably during the anti-Japanese
resistance of the 1930s and 1940s, successfully
mobilized popular resistance. Neither Trump
nor, it seems, any of his advisers, has the
slightest understanding of the history and
power of Chinese nationalism as exhibited in
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China’s struggle against Japanese and Western
imperialism, or its clash with the US in Korea
and Vietnam from the 1950s, or its break with
the Soviet Union in the 1960s.
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo thinks the
struggle with Huawei Technologies Company is
ideological—either “Western values” or
communist values will rule the internet, he
says—while Kiron Skinner, the director of
policy planning at the State Department, views
the China rivalry, strangely, as a “fight with a
really different civilization and a different
ideology.”19 The Trump administration seems
oblivious to the Xi Jinping leadership’s repeated
references to a “new Long March,” alluding to
the guerrilla struggles that led to the defeat of
Japan invaders and the founding of the People’s
Republic—that is, overcoming difficulties, and
defending China’s economic development path,
which it now defines as a “core interest.”20 The
administration also underestimates China’s
alternatives to giving in on commercial issues,
notably the Regional Comprehensive Trade
Partnership it initiated, which links twenty-five
Asia-Pacific members,21 and Beijing’s ability to
punish (according to China’s commerce
ministry) “unreliable” foreign companies that
“do not follow market rules, violate the spirit of
contracts, blockade and stop supplying Chinese
companies for noncommercial reasons, and
seriously damage the legitimate rights and
interests of Chinese companies.” The real cost
here is not just to business, but to the US
reputation, for paradoxically China can now
pose as the principal defender not only of
global markets but also of the multinational
global order that the US had long pioneered
and now scorns.

The Costs of Demonizing China
Beyond commercial ties, Americans and
Chinese should recognize that we need each
other when it comes to effectively confronting

global problems including nuclear proliferation,
climate crisis, humanitarian crises, the
provision of sustainable energy sources, and
bringing an end to the Korean War. Neither
country is in a position to contain, much less
resolve, any of these problems on its own. As
Ana Swanson and Keith Bradsher argue,
America First is an aggressive vision of
American power that seeks to upend a rival
system that has delivered prosperity for its
people and has put China on course to be the
world’s largest economy.22 We must rise above
the “win-at-all-costs” approach and rivalry
between the United States and China to
recognize the two nations’ interdependence.
The list of disputed issues between the US and
China includes confrontations over Taiwan,
Tibet, and the South China Sea, as well as
policy differences over North Korea, Russia,
Korea, Iran, and Africa. US policies on many of
these issues not only risk worsening them, they
also threaten to drive the Chinese into closer
relationships with countries that share Beijing’s
opposition to those policies, especially Russia,
with which China now has a “comprehensive
strategic partnership of coordination.” On Iran,
for example, Xi Jinping has rejected the US
demand that countries stop importing Iran’s oil.
He declared that “China and Russia’s views and
positions on the Iran nuclear issue are highly
aligned” and called on “all relevant parties to
remain rational and exercise restraint, step up
dialogue and consultations and lower the
temperature on the present tense situation.”23
The growing US-China tension is affecting
scientific and educational exchanges, including
reciprocal
visa
denials
for
24
scholars. Particularly pernicious is the
officially-inspired suspicion of Chinese
scientists, including Americans of Chinese
origin, many of whom are working at US
universities and laboratories. With little
evidence, these scientists and doctoral students
are being cast as security risks. While a few
cases of espionage have emerged, visiting
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Chinese scientists and technicians have been a
great boon to US research.25 Chinese students
comprise the largest contingent of foreign
students in the US—more than 130,000
graduate students and 148,000 undergraduates
enrolled in 2017-2018—and their ability to pay
full freight keeps afloat many of the colleges
and universities they attend. As the president
of MIT laments, these days anyone of Chinese
ethnicity “now feel[s] unfairly scrutinized,
stigmatized and on edge” when dealing with
26
the US government.
Finally, we must reckon with the cost of ceding
international leadership to China on
globalization, multilateralism, and recognition
as a “responsible great power.” Trump’s
behavior has seriously undermined US
leadership—to China’s advantage. While the
PRC can claim to be a model of restraint on
North Korea and Iran, for example, even
lecturing Washington on its “unilateral
sanctions” and “bullying” of Iran, 27 the US
president, while reveling in high-profile
meetings with Xi Jinping and Kim Jong-un,
keeps China under heavy threat of tariffs, leads
a leaky sanctions campaign against North
Korea, and seeks regime change in Iran. As a
result, if “America First” comes to mean
“America Alone,” China may all the more
become the go-to power. The dispute over
Huawei is illustrative: US pressure on its
European and Asian partners to reject
Huawei’s 5G technology is matched by China’s
campaign on Huawei’s behalf to reject
American pressure.28 Some countries will play
ball with China (like Russia) while others (like
Canada) apparently will bow to US pressures,
as in the grudging detention of a Huawei
executive at US behest, an act that has
poisoned Canada’s relations with a major trade
partner.
How the US-China rivalry will play out cannot
be confidently predicted. To be sure, China’s
BRI has gained important new footholds for
Beijing in Africa, Latin America, Central Asia,

and even southern Europe on the strength of
large-scale Chinese loans. Will that enable
China to establish a new international order?
What seems clear is that the US retreat since
2017 has left the door open to Chinese
predominance in trade and foreign aid.

What To Do About China?
At the height of the Cold War in the 1950s and
1960s, liberal policy toward China called for
“containment without isolation” at a time when
revolution was the “main current” in China’s
foreign policy, the Soviet Union ranked second
to the US as a hegemonic power, and China’s
role in the world economy was inconsequential.
In the current era, what if US policy toward
China were engagement-and-competition? It
could distinguish China from Russia rather
than giving Russia a pass as Trump has done.
Russia, unlike China, has interfered in US and
European elections, has annexed Ukraine’s
Crimea, and supports an occupying force in
eastern Ukraine. The US would reject the “dual
enemies” approach that ensures closer PRCRussian cooperation, especially in military
affairs, which mainly involves joint exercises
and (Russian) arms and military technology
sales.29 Engagement-and-competition in fact
was the US policy toward China from the early
1970s. Today the policy would stress the ties
that bind with China as distinct from those with
Russia, and the advantages to both China and
the US of closer economic and geopolitical
relations.
That approach, however, requires a more
realistic perspective on China than the Trump
administration and both political parties favor
today. Ivo Daalder offers a sage observation:
“There is nothing unusual with what China is
doing. It’s acting like any great power
would—using its economic and military
prowess to extend its political influence to all
corners of the globe. And quite naturally, it
seeks that influence to serve its own interests
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and purposes.” 30 Some liberals see a threat
precisely there, endorsing Mike Pompeo’s view
that Beijing poses “a new kind of challenge; an
authoritarian regime that’s integrated
economically into the West in ways that the
Soviet Union never was.” 3 1 This latter
interpretation of what the administration calls
China’s “economic aggression” ignores how
strongly the Chinese support the contemporary
international economic status quo. It fails to
recognize that China is deeply embedded in the
world capitalist system, has delivered
remarkable economic gains to its people, and
has no interest in disrupting the basic rules of
the system that are essential to its continued
prosperity. If China doesn’t always play fair,
Daalder argues, the best way to counter it is to
rely on the one arena where China is weakest,
allies: “America’s rivalry with China is
inevitable. But competition need not lead to
confrontation. If America works together with
its allies, friends and partners, it can continue
to shape the international order to the benefit
of all.” Trump, Fareed Zakaria reports, rejects
that approach, seeking victory in a zero-sum
game that prefers “hardball” to cooperation in
creating a bigger pie.32
Meanwhile, China’s American critics are so
absorbed in the trade and technology war that
crucial issues in US-China relations are not
receiving the attention they deserve. Just to
take a few examples: Massive demonstrations
in Hong Kong continuing over several weeks
have led to the suspension of an extradition law
that Beijing supports, a defeat for Xi Jinping.
China’s direct military intervention is a
possibility. Yet Trump has reportedly promised
Xi that the US would “tone down” its criticism
of China’s actions in Hong Kong in return for
progress on trade talks. 33 At the same time,
China’s BRI, while demonstrating the appeal of
Beijing’s aid strategy, also raises the possibility
of unsustainable debts. Since the aid is
typically in the form of loans, recipients
sometimes pay a high price—such as Sri
Lanka’s transfer of ownership of a port to

China when it could not pay up, Greece’s
agreement to majority Chinese ownership of
the historic port of Piraeus in return for loans
and investments, and Cambodia’s agreement to
provide China naval access to a port on the
Gulf of Thailand to offset aid. 34 China’s debt
diplomacy may at times conflict with US and
NATO interests.
On the other hand, China’s increasing reliance
on nuclear energy, along with hydro and solar
power, makes it the world’s leader in
alternative energy, offering opportunities for
cooperative projects with the United States and
other countries even as it continues to produce
the world’s largest output of greenhouse
35
gas. Another potential issue on which to seek
common ground is intermediate-range missiles,
just one element of a rapidly modernizing
Chinese military that worries the US Pacific
Command.36 US withdrawal from the INF treaty
was reportedly due in part to China’s growing
arsenal, estimated at 2000 ballistic and cruise
missiles, mainly deployed opposite Taiwan.
Might a US-China agreement be negotiated
that would (for example) cap missile numbers
and types and also meet China’s objections to
the THAAD missile defense system based in
South Korea? Unless an agreement with China
is reached, the US might test and seek land
basing rights for a new cruise missile system
aimed at China, which would probably ignite an
37
arms race in East Asia.
The Trump administration’s relentless pursuit
of an America First agenda with its attack on
China’s trade, technology, and aid policies may
be injuring China, as Trump keeps insisting,
but it is also injuring the world and US
economies.38
Trump’s
own
constituents—farmers, miners, and industrial
workers as well as leading sectors of capital
and finance—are or soon will be among its
main victims. The simultaneous pursuit of
complementarity and competition between
China and the US holds the best route forward
for the American, Chinese and world
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economies, and for the reduction of tensions
that threaten a war that nobody wants.39 For
Americans, this will mean abandoning
unrealistic hopes that China will change
because of external pressure or the inevitable
attractiveness of Western values and political
models, or that the United States will solve its

problems of trade and balance of payments
imbalance and de-industrialization through
imposing crippling tariffs on China. As the
enormous outpouring of popular protest in
Hong Kong suggests, change in China must
come from within, just as it must in the US.
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